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ON ACCOUNT OF RACE OR COLOR: RACE AS CORPORATION 
AND THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF RACE 
Reginald Oh 
This Essay is a critique of constitutional and political discourse on 
"race." I argue that current equal protection doctrine operates 
under a conception of race that undermines rather than moves 
forward the goal of achieving racial equality. That understanding 
defines race solely or primarily as a physical trait or characteristic, 
and unjustifiably rejects other, more robust notions of race. I argue 
the notion of race as physical trait is inconsistent with the historical 
understanding of race that served as the basis for the 
Reconstruction Amendments. A careful examination of nineteenth 
and early twentieth century court decisions, decisions which include 
Plessy u. Ferguson 1 and Strauder u. West Virginia, 2 suggests that 
the framers of the Reconstruction Amendments and the Supreme 
Court Justices of that era thought of race, not as a physical trait, 
but as an entity with a corporate existence. In other words, they 
thought of race as corporation. 
Part I will critique current equal protection doctrine and argue 
that it has adopted a narrow and constitutionally problematic 
definition of race as physical trait. Part II will then examine the 
original understanding of race and discuss the concept of race as 
corporation. Part III will then examine the implications of the race 
as corporation concept for rethinking current equal protection 
doctrine. 
I 
Political and legal discourse about race is often confusing and 
bewildering because we often fail to fully understand that, as an 
"essentially contested concept0,"3 "race" has no fixed, essential 
I 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
2 100 U.S. 303 (1879). 
3 W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN Soc'Y, 167, 167-68 
(1956) (describing "essentially contested concepts" as those that intrinsically have no fixed 
meaning). 
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meaning and is thus subject to multiple definitions.4 In the post-
Brown,5 late twentieth and early twenty-first century era, the 
unstated, default assumption in legal discourse was that race refers 
to a physical trait such as skin color, or an identity based on skin 
color.6 But of course, race as skin color or as racial identity is not 
the only way to think about and conceive of race. Consequently, 
when we engage in racial discourse, confusion and 
misunderstanding are inevitable if we forget about the 
multidimensional nature of the concept of race. Too often, 
discursive actors assume that they hold the same assumptions 
about the meaning of race when in actuality, they hold related but 
different understandings. What's more, an actor will often use 
multiple definitions of race without being consciously aware that he 
or she is doing so. 
Current equal protection doctrine on race is conceptually and 
practically incoherent, in large part because there is an illusory 
consensus regarding the constitutional meaning of race. Thus, in 
Richmond v. Croson, Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Thurgood 
Marshall seemed to agree that the Fourteenth Amendment was 
centrally concerned with the problem of race. 7 In her plurality 
opinion, O'Connor asserted that, "[t]he Civil War Amendments 
themselves worked a dramatic change in the balance between 
congressional and state power over matters of race."8 While 
dissenting from O'Connor's opm10n, Marshall nevertheless 
expressed his agreement with O'Connor's understanding of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, stating, "[t]he three Reconstruction 
Amendments undeniably 'worked a dramatic change in the balance 
between congressional and state power."'9 
Yet, despite their agreement regarding the fundamental 
relationship between the Fourteenth Amendment and "race," 
Justice O'Connor voted to strike down a local government race-
conscious affirmative action program as a form of invidious racial 
discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal 
Protection Clause,10 while Justice Marshall voted to uphold the 
race-conscious set-aside as entirely consistent with the Fourteenth 
4 See Sharona Hoffman, Is There a Place for "Race" as a Legal Concept?, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
1093, 1096-97 (2004) (listing various different understandings ofrace). 
5 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
s See Hoffman, supra note 4, at 1132. 
7 Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
s Id. at 490. 
9 Id. at 560 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
10 Id. at 511. 
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Amendment Equal Protection Clause. 11 
O'Connor and Marshall's disagreeable agreement over the 
relationship between "race" and the Fourteenth Amendment 
beautifully captures the essentially confused state of current equal 
protection doctrine on race. To understand how the two justices 
could come to different conclusions despite seemingly agreeing on 
the centrality of race to equal protection doctrine, it is crucial to 
understand that they are thinking about and using the term race in 
very different ways. While O'Connor and the Rehnquist Court refer 
to race solely as a physical trait, Marshall and critics of the 
Rehnquist Court equal protection doctrine refer to race as a trait 
and as a social group. The different approaches to race and equal 
protection have had enormous doctrinal and political consequences. 
The central doctrinal premise of current equal protection doctrine 
is the notion that all governmental uses of race are inherently 
arbitrary and irrational, and therefore laws relying on race must be 
presumed to be unconstitutional and subject to the most rigorous 
level of judicial scrutiny. 12 And under strict scrutiny analysis, the 
government has the heavy burden to demonstrate that its use of 
race is necessary to serve a compelling government interest. 13 
Accordingly, if all uses of race are inherently suspect, then, the 
argument is that even ''benign" uses of race in the context of 
affirmative action equal opportunity and racial integration plans 
should be subject to strict scrutiny. 
Even well intentioned race-conscious affirmative action programs 
run afoul of equal protection because they engage in the very 
practice that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to 
eliminate-discrimination on the basis of race (skin color). 
Government decisions based on race as skin color, even if those 
decisions are made for legitimate or compelling purposes, would be 
akin to making irrational decisions to award jobs and contracts 
based on other morally and legally irrelevant traits like eye color or 
hair color. 14 
Reading Rehnquist Court decisions on race and equal protection, 
one would get the clear sense that it is self-evident and inherently 
correct that all uses of race are constitutionally suspect. As Justice 
O'Connor explained, all "[c]lassifications based on race carry a 
danger of stigmatic harm" and "they may in fact promote notions of 
11 Id. at 528 (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
12 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 720-21 (2007). 
13 Id. 
l< See id. at 726. 
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racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility," even if a 
classification is aimed at promoting racial equality. 15 Echoing 
Justice O'Connor, Chief Justice Roberts emphasized in a 2007 equal 
protection race case, "[g]overnment action dividing us by race is 
inherently suspect because such classifications promote notions of 
racial inferiority [leading] to a politics of racial hostility, [and] 
reinforce the beliefD held by too many for too much of our history, 
that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin."16 
However, the principle that all racial classifications are 
inherently suspect is a recent doctrinal development. 17 During the 
height of the civil rights era, the Court employed strict scrutiny 
analysis to strike down racially discriminatory Jim Crow laws that 
maintained and reinforced racial segregation. The Court, however, 
subjected race-conscious affirmative action programs, to a lower 
level of judicial scrutiny, as they were considered ''benign" racial 
classifications deserving of greater legislative deference. But, at 
least formally, that deference disappeared under the Rehnquist 
Court, as the Court in Croson and Adarand held that all racial 
classifications, whether benign in purpose or not, are equally 
suspect, and must be subject to the same level of rigorous judicial 
scrutiny. 18 The rhetoric and logic of current equal protection 
doctrine have been extremely effective in undermining the 
legitimacy and constitutionality of race-conscious equal opportunity 
and racial integration plans. While there have been many 
insightful critiques of the various problems with current equal 
protection doctrine, curiously, very few critiques have noticed or 
emphasized how the current doctrine's rhetorical power 
fundamentally depends on a very narrow definition of race solely as 
skin color for its persuasiveness. 
That rhetorical power is evident in the Supreme Court's 2007 
decision in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School 
District Number One. 19 In that case, the Court held that voluntary 
race-conscious admissions plans violated equal protection, even if 
those plans were enacted by school districts to maintain and 
promote racially integrated student bodies in their schools.20 
15 Croson, 488 U.S. at 493. 
is Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 746 (internal quotations omitted). 
17 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 490-91 (holding, for the first by a majority of the Court, that 
''benign" racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny). 
is Id.; Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
19 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
20 Id. at 747-48. 
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In a plurality decision written by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court 
held that the school districts failed to demonstrate that its interest 
in having racially integrated schools was a compelling interest.21 
Moreover, the Court concluded that their actual interest in making 
race-conscious admissions decisions was not to promote racial 
integration, but to engage in the patently illegitimate goal of naked 
"racial balancing," which the Court defines as the goal of wanting a 
racially proportionate student body purely for its own sake.22 In 
other words, the Roberts plurality sought to overrule the racial 
integration mandate of Brown v. Board of Education and hold that 
the goal of racial integration is an inherently illegitimate interest. 
Although the Roberts Court ultimately failed in its attempt to 
overrule Brown, the Court came very close to doing so. Only Justice 
Kennedy's refusal to join Roberts and three other justices prevented 
Brown's reversal. It is vital, therefore, to vigorously critique the 
Court's reasoning in Parents Involved. Specifically, it is important 
to become aware of how the way Roberts defined race to mean only 
skin color was the basis for much of the rhetorical power of his 
opinion. 
First, one astounding aspect of Roberts' opinion is that, in 
effectively seeking to overrule Brown, Roberts actually contended 
that Warren Court and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund attorneys 
who argued the Brown case would wholeheartedly support his 
attempt to overrule Brown. And what is even more amazing is that 
Roberts was able to make such arguments with a straight face and 
in a persuasive manner. 
In asserting that the NAACP attorneys who litigated Brown v. 
Board of Education on behalf of the black plaintiffs would 
wholeheartedly endorse his opinion, Roberts actually quotes a 
passage from a brief written by one of the Brown lawyers: 
As counsel who appeared before this Court for the plaintiffs 
in Brown put it: "We have one fundamental 
contention ... and that contention is that no State has any 
authority under the equal-protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to use race as a factor in affording 
educational opportunities among its citizens.23 
And because the school districts in Parents Involved are using 
race (as skin color) as a factor in affording educational 
21 Id. at 730. 
22 Id. at 727-31. 
2a Id. at 747 (emphasis added). 
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opportunities, Roberts contends that the NAACP Legal Defense 
Fund attorneys clearly would support the Court's decision to strike 
down the discriminatory racial integration plans.24 
Second, Roberts also very cleverly evoked the moral cause of the 
Civil Rights Movement by arguing that the white students 
challenging the voluntary school integration plan in Parents 
Involved were similarly situated to the black schoolchildren who 
sought integrated schooling in Brown v. Board of Education. 
Roberts reasoned, "[b]efore Brown, schoolchildren were told where 
they could and could not go to school based on the color of their skin. 
The school districts in these [current] cases have not carried the 
heavy burden of demonstrating that we should allow this once 
again."25 In other words, for Roberts, the white students in Parents 
Involved were facing the very same discriminatory treatment that 
the black plaintiffs forced to attend segregated schools faced in 
Brown. Drawing Roberts' reasoning to its logical conclusion, the 
black children in Parents Involved must then be equivalent to the 
white children in Jim Crow south, as both groups, through their 
parents, sought to protect and maintain racially discriminatory 
school systems. 
Third, Roberts rejects Justice Breyer's argument in dissent that 
voluntary racial integration programs are constitutionally 
distinguishable from Jim Crow school segregation laws because 
racial integration plans seek to promote racial inclusion, while Jim 
Crow segregation laws promoted the exclusion of particular racial 
groups from meaningful educational opportunities. Roberts notes, 
"Justice Breyer speaks of bringing 'the races' together (putting aside 
the purely black-and-white nature of the plans), as the justification 
for excluding individuals on the basis of their race."26 Roberts 
responds to his articulation of Breyer's position by effectively 
arguing that any attempt to protect particular racial groups 
through racial integration of public schools is an approach to race 
that is "fundamentally at odds with our precedent, which makes 
clear that the Equal Protection Clause 'protect[s] persons, not 
groups."'27 In other words, the goal of "bringing 'the races' together" 
is inconsistent with equal protection, because that goal recognizes 
and seeks to protect racial groups, and equal protection is not about 
protecting racial groups. Rather, it is about ensuring that an 
2• Id. 
2s Id. (emphasis added). 
2s Id. at 742-43. 
27 Id. at 743 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)). 
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individual's dignity and worth are not demeaned by being "'judged 
by [race] instead of by his or her own merit and essential 
qualities."'28 
The brilliant aspect of Roberts' opinion is that, while it may seem 
plain and clear that the Warren Court justices and the LDF 
attorneys would not actually support its holding and reasoning, it is 
difficult to explain exactly why not, especially given the passages 
quoted by Roberts. Clearly, Roberts has taken those passages out of 
context, but, how? 
II 
The key to critiquing the Roberts opinion in Parents Involved is to 
explicitly point out and critique Robert's narrow use of race as skin 
color. While the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts may define race to 
mean solely skin color, the crucial point is that historically, race 
meant something else entirely. And, only when it is understood 
that the Brown Court and the LDF attorneys thought of race, not 
just as skin color, but as corporation, does it become clear that that 
the Brown litigants and justices would not support Roberts' opinion. 
This Part will contend that current equal protection doctrine, in 
defining race solely as skin color, is relying on a narrow conception 
of race that is inconsistent with the original meaning of race as 
understood by the framers of the Reconstruction Amendments, and 
inconsistent with the more complex understanding of race held by 
the Brown Court and by the Brown attorneys. 
Rather, a preliminary examination of historical materials suggest 
that the historical understanding of race that was the basis for the 
Reconstruction Amendments was an understanding consistent with 
the notion of race as social groups. Specifically, the tentative thesis 
that will be developed and elaborated in future articles is this: the 
framers of the Reconstruction Amendments and contemporary 
Supreme Court Justices conceptualized "race" not as a physical 
trait, but more broadly as a corporate-like entity, an entity with a 
"corporate personality" separate and distinct from the identities of 
its individual members. 
A. 
How did the Reconstruction framers think of and use the term 
2s Id. at 746 (quoting Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 496 (2000)). 
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race? In discerning the original meaning of race, it is important to 
point out that both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments fail 
to mention race at all. The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits most 
forms of slavery and involuntary servitude with no reference to 
race. Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment protects the privileges 
and immunities of all citizens, and the equal protection and due 
process rights of all persons, but does not provide legal protections 
specifically on the basis of race. And despite Justices O'Connor and 
Marshall's belief that the Reconstruction Amendments as a whole 
and the Fourteenth Amendment in particular dramatically shifted 
the power to regulate race from states to the federal government, 
there is no textual provision in the Fourteenth Amendment that 
mandated that shift of power. Section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment does grant Congress the power to enforce the other four 
sections of the Amendment. However, none of those other four 
sections mention race. 
The Fifteenth Amendment is the only Reconstruction Amendment 
that includes a textual reference to race. It states: "The right of 
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged 
by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude."29 If the term race has no inherent 
fixed meaning, the question arises, which particular meaning of 
"race" constituted the framers' original understanding? To answer 
this question, it is important to note that the Fifteenth Amendment 
prohibits the infringement of the right to vote on the basis of both 
"race" and "color." According to blackletter rules of constitutional 
and statutory construction, each term in the Amendment must be 
given independent meaning. That begs the question: what is the 
difference between race and color? 
First, beginning with the concept of "color," based on our twenty-
first century understanding of the term, one may assume that the 
term refers generally to the physical trait of skin color. However, 
an examination of nineteenth and early twentieth century legal 
sources discussing the meaning of the term color based on state 
laws suggests that the term color in the Fifteenth Amendment was 
referring, not to a universal physical trait, but, specifically to the 
skin color of members of non-white races only. 
In Rice u. Gong Lum,30 the Supreme Court of Mississippi dealt 
with the issue of where Chinese-American students fit within its 
29 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
ao 104 So. 105 (Miss. 1925), affd 275 U.S. 78 (1927). 
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racially segregated school system. When Gong Lum was decided, 
the Mississippi State Constitution required that "[s]eparate schools 
shall be maintained for children of the white and colored races."31 
While the term "colored races" included African-Americans, the 
question in Gong Lum was whether a Chinese-American student 
should be considered white or colored under the state constitution. 
The court held that a Chinese student was a member of the "colored 
race" and therefore had to be assigned to schools attended by 
African-American students.32 The court reasoned, 
One of the definitions given to the word "colored," as applied 
to race, is "of a dark skin or non-Caucasian race." The same 
definition is practically given by Mr. Webster in his 
dictionary. The word "white," as applied to race, where not 
affected by statutory definition, is universally limited to the 
Caucasian race.33 
In other words, the court concluded that the term "colored" did 
not refer generically to skin color, but specifically to a person who 
belonged to either "a dark skin or non-Caucasian race."34 The term 
color, according to the Mississippi Supreme Court, did not and was 
not meant to include or refer to the skin color of members of the 
white race. 
An examination of a mid-nineteenth century California court 
decision, People v. Hall, 35 also suggests that the term color was 
historically understood to refer to the physical attributes associated 
with non-white racial groups. In Hall, the issue was whether a 
Chinese person should be categorized as legally white or black for 
the purposes of testifying as a witness in an action involving a white 
party. A California statute prohibited blacks or Indians from 
testifying in an action involving a white person as a party.36 
However, the statute failed to explicitly mention Chinese or other 
Asian nationalities and whether they were excluded as well. The 
court held that a Chinese person is, for statutory purposes, a "black" 
person and therefore excluded from participating as a witness.37 
The Hall court reasoned that the term ''black" has a broader 
meaning than the term "negro": "The word 'Black' may include all 
31 Id. at 107 (quoting MISS. CONST. art. VIII, § 207 (repealed 1977)). 
32 Id. at llO. 
33 Id. at 108. 
34 Id. 
35 4 Cal. 399 (1854). 
36 Id. at 399. 
31 Id. at 404. 
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Negroes, but the term 'Negro' does not include all Black persons."38 
Thus, a Chinese person could be considered "black" for purposes of 
the statute. However, because that analysis still did not answer the 
question whether the Chinese person should be categorized as black 
or white under the statute, the Hall court proceeded to define the 
statutory meaning of the term "white." The court concluded, "[t]he 
word "White" has a distinct signification, which ex vi termini, 
excludes black, yellow, and all other colors."39 In other words, under 
the statute, while the term black was a broad term that could 
include racial groups in addition to African-Americans, the term 
white was a narrow term referring specifically and only to members 
of the white or Caucasian race. Accordingly, because a Chinese 
person clearly is not white or Caucasian, by default, the court held 
that a Chinese person had to be deemed to be a "black person" for 
purposes of the statute. 
What about the term "race"? How was that term generally 
understood when the Reconstruction Amendments were ratified? 
The 1887 Webster's Dictionary defines "race" as "descendants of a 
common ancestor; a family, tribe, people or nation, believed or 
presumed to belong to the same stock."40 This definition clearly is 
defining something that is more than just a physical trait. The 
definition seems to view race as discrete groups of people, or affinity 
groups, groups of people connected together by principles, family 
ties, or biology. 
In Plessy v. Ferguson41 the majority of the Court created the 
"separate but equal" doctrine to justify the Constitutional basis for 
laws that segregated whites from blacks in various social settings. 
The Court further equates "race" with discrete racial groups by 
saying that 
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiffs 
argument [that segregation is unconstitutional] to consist in 
the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races 
stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be 
so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely 
because the colored race chooses to put that construction 
upon it .... If the civil and political rights of both races be 
equal one cannot be inferior to the other civilly or politically. 
If one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution 
38 Id. at 403. 
39 Id. at 404-05. 
40 See Wamget v. State, 67 S.W.3d 851, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). 
41 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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of the United States cannot put them upon the same plane.42 
In this famous passage, when the Court mentioned "race," it was 
using race to refer to "race of people" or a racial group, and not 
referring to it as a physical trait or skin color. 
Even Justice Harlan in his Plessy dissent used the term race to 
refer to racial groups: 
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this 
country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in 
education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will 
continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great 
heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional 
liberty.43 
In this passage, Justice Harlan, along with the Plessy majority, 
personifies the white and black races, treating them as if they were 
individual persons with their own identity or personality. Thus, for 
Harlan, the "white race," like a person, is well-educated, wealthy, 
and powerful. 
In personifying the white and black races, the Plessy majority and 
dissent both seem to understand "race" as corporate-like entity. 
While an in depth discussion of race as corporation is beyond the 
scope of this essay, I want to lay out the basic argument for that 
understanding of race. 
Under the well-settled law of corporations, once properly 
incorporated, a corporation has the legal status of a "person," and 
has various legal rights and duties as a "natural person" would 
have. 44 As a legal "person," a corporation has its own corporate 
identity or personality independent and distinct from the 
personalities of the individuals who make up the corporation.45 
Similarly, a careful examination of the opinions in Plessy suggests 
that the Justices conceived of "race" in corporation-like terms. 
Justice Harlan discussed not the achievements of individual white 
Americans, but the achievements, wealth, and power of the "white 
race."46 The Plessy majority treated the white and black races as if 
they were persons capable of holding particular political and civil 
42 Id. at 551-52 (emphasis added). 
4a Id. at 559 (Harlan, J. dissenting). 
44 See generally David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 203 (1990) 
("[T]he corporation, like any other person, should enjoy the freedom to act as a socially 
responsible citizen."); John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 
35 YALE L.J. 655 (1926) (describing the legal treatment of a corporation). 
45 See Dewey, supra note 44, at 669. 
46 See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J. dissenting). 
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rights, in the same way corporations are legally able to have rights 
that are qualitatively different than the rights that individual 
members of the corporation may have. 
In Strauder v. West Virginia, the Supreme Court analyzed the 
issue of racial discrimination in jury selection utilizing the notion of 
race as corporation.47 In Strauder, the Court struck down under 
equal protection grounds a West Virginia law prohibiting black men 
from serving on juries. In striking down the law, the Court did not 
talk in the language of personal rights, nor did it talk about the 
dangers of discriminating on the basis of a suspect trait such as 
skin color. Rather, the Court reasoned that the law excluding black 
men from jury service was a form of invidious discrimination that 
"impl[ied] [legal] inferiority in civil society, [which] lessen[ed] the 
security of. . . [the right of the colored race and was a] stepO 
towards reducing them to the condition of a subject race."48 
In viewing Strauder as a decision about race as corporation, the 
decision becomes less about an individual's right to serve on a jury, 
and more about the protection of the black race as a corporate 
entity. The protection of an individual's right to serve on a jury can 
be understood as a means to prevent the ''black race" from being 
reduced to the status of a "subject race" through racially 
discriminatory and exclusionary laws aimed at members of the 
black race. I suggest that this, then, was the original 
understanding of race and equal protection. 
III 
I want to conclude this essay by exploring the implications of 
analyzing "race" in historical-linguistic context. First, if in fact the 
framers of the Reconstruction Amendments understood race as 
having corporation-like attributes, then, the Court's assertion that 
equal protection doctrine protects individuals but not racial groups 
is inconsistent with a historical understanding of the 
Reconstruction Amendments. Thus, if "original meaning" is to be 
given any weight in determining what race means for equal 
protection purposes, then the current doctrinal focus on protecting 
individuals but not groups is misplaced. 
Second, if the notion of race solely as skin color is not supported 
by original meaning, then the question arises, what is the 
41 100 U.S. 303 (1879). 
4s Id. at 308. 
2009] On Account of Race or Color 1039 
constitutional justification for defining race in that way? And, what 
is the constitutional justification for rejecting a conception of race 
that is more consistent with original meaning? If there is no solid 
constitutional basis to reduce the meaning of race to a physical 
trait, then it becomes much easier to argue that the current 
conception of race in equal protection law arises in large part due to 
the Justices' naked policy and moral preferences. Reducing race to 
skin color may have no justification or function other than to 
restrict and undermine the scope and breadth of affirmative action 
plans seeking to expand equal opportunity for racial minorities. 
Arguably, that has been the agenda of the Court from Bakke49 on-
from Bakke to Croson50 to Adarand51 to Grutter52 and then to 
Parents Involved-which was Roberts' ultimately failed attempt to 
effectively overrule Brown v. Board of Education53 and its racial 
integration mandate. 54 
Third, understanding race as corporation helps us to better 
understand the purpose and function of racial segregation in public 
schools: segregation operated to protect the "corporate personality" 
of the white race. In Rice v. Gong Lum, the Mississippi Supreme 
Court explained: 
To all persons acquainted with the social conditions of this 
state and of the Southern states generally it is well known 
that it is the earnest desire of the white race to preserve its 
racial integrity and purity, and to maintain the purity of the 
social relations as far as it can be done by law.55 
The court then explained that segregation helps maintain the 
purity of the white race by preventing race amalgamation or the 
mixing or corrupting of the white race with inferior races.56 
Segregation of school children was vital to preventing race 
amalgamation, because segregationists feared that if white and 
49 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
50 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
51 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
52 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
53 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
54 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). The 
Roberts opinion failed to gain the necessary fifth vote to make it binding Court precedent. 
Although Justice Anthony Kennedy concurred in the Court's plurality opinion and voted to 
strike down the voluntary integration plans at issue in Parents Involved, Kennedy did not 
agree with the plurality's holding that racial diversity is not a compelling interest. He 
instead struck down the plans on narrow tailoring grounds. Id. at 751, 760 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
55 Rice v. Gong Lum, 104 So. 105, 108 (Miss. 1925) (emphasis added). 
5s Id. at llO. 
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black children attended school together as social equals, interracial 
relationships and marriages would become normalized and over 
time, the amalgamation of the races would result in the destruction 
of the white race and the creation of a mongrel or mixed-race 
nation. To use the language of corporations, segregation was an 
essential tool to preserve and maintain the distinct and superior 
corporate identity of the "white race." 
Finally, thinking of race as corporation helps us to more 
effectively critique Roberts' opinion in Parents Involved. Once we 
understand that the Brown Court and the LDF attorneys did not 
think of race solely as a physical trait, then, it becomes clear that 
their understanding of race does not support the reasoning and 
holding in Parents Involved. In fact, the entire desegregation case 
law that followed in wake of Brown would not make any sense if the 
concept of race as corporation was erased from equal protection 
doctrine and race was understood solely as a physical trait. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A central goal of this essay was to clarify the constitutional and 
political discourse on race. To gain clarity, it is crucial to carefully 
understand that race is a term with multiple meanings; otherwise, 
confusion and obfuscation inevitably result if agreement regarding 
its meaning is assumed. And as this essay has suggested, any 
project to reconstruct equal protection doctrine on race will benefit 
from exploring and analyzing the concept of race as corporation. 
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